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The Establishment of China’s New Type 
Rural Social Insurance Pension:
A Process Perspective
Matthias STEPAN and LU Quan 
Abstract: This study explores the processes and outcomes of the 
public policy reforms from 2002 to 2014, targeting income security 
among the elderly for a segment of the Chinese population that was 
increasingly marginalised throughout the 1990s: the rural population. 
The authors reconstruct the policy process from 2002 until 2014 that 
led to the establishment of the New Type Rural Social Insurance 
Pension and assess its impact on providing adequate and sustainable 
old-age income. One particular focus is the study of the influence of 
international actors. Yet, as key to the success of the initiative, the 
authors identify the decisive support of the central level leadership, 
which facilitated the process by announcing a new development model 
and providing earmarked transfers from the central government. 
Despite the improvements in the income security of elderly rural 
Chinese, questions remain about the Chinese pension system’s long-
term sustainability and the influence of the system’s fragmentation on 
social mobility and equality.  
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Introduction 
Providing adequate and sustainable pensions for its ageing population 
is one of China’s main challenges. Despite major efforts in the 1990s 
to extend the coverage under old-age pension insurance programmes, 
the results up until the year 2002 were more than disappointing: less 
than 40 per cent of the urban workforce and only slightly more than 
10 per cent of the rural workforce were covered. Efforts targeting 
those segments of the Chinese population that were increasingly 
marginalised throughout the 1990s – the rural population, rural-to-
urban migrants, and urbanites without employers – remained ineffec-
tive. By the end of 2014, the numbers tell a different story. Whereas 
the number of participants in the pension scheme for urban employ-
ees remained rather stable, more than half a billion individuals were 
covered under two new schemes as of 2014: the New Type Rural 
Social Insurance Pension (ᯠරߌᶁ⽮Պޫ㘱؍䲙 , xinxing nongcun 
shehui yanglao baoxian; also known as the New Rural Pension Scheme, 
NRPS) and the Urban Residents’ Old-Age Social Insurance Pension  
(෾䭷ት≁⽮Պޫ㘱؍䲙 , chengzhen jumin shehui yanglao baoxian; also 
known as the Urban Residents Pension Scheme, URPS) – a pension 
scheme for individuals with urban hukou (ᡧਓ, “household registra-
tion”) who do not take part in the urban employee pension scheme. 
Among those, more than 140 million are already receiving old-age 
pensions (MoHRSS 2015). In 2014, the State Council announced the 
formal merger of the NRPS and the URPS, which had originally been 
established and run independently from each other (Reuters 2014). 
Henceforth, the scheme became known as the residents’ social insur-
ance pension scheme (RPS, ෾ґት≁⽮Պޫ㘱؍䲙, chengxiang jumin 
shehui yanglao baoxian). The extension of the coverage under the public 
pension system through two new pension schemes and their eventual 
merger constitutes a break with two legacies: 1) selectively providing 
old-age income only to employees in urban enterprises and individu-
als retiring from state and party organs, and 2) the strict institutional 
division between social policies for individuals in urban and rural 
areas.  
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In this study,1 we explore the process leading to the establish-
ment of the NRPS and coverage extension. Our leading research 
question reads as follows: How can the establishment of the NRPS scheme 
be explained against the legacy of one-sided protection of urban employees and the 
dominance of family-based solutions for providing old-age income in the country-
side? Building on existing scholarship on pension reform and policy-
making in China, we reconstruct the policy process leading to the 
implementation of the scheme and its current status. Special attention 
is paid to the influence of international actors. The period covered 
ranges from 2002 to early 2014. Using the method of process tracing, 
we select and analyse data to determine who the major actors pushing 
for the establishment of the new pension scheme have been, and 
what factors facilitated the success of the policy initiative. Last, in 
order to make a qualified statement about if and how the marginalisa-
tion of the rural population has changed, we provide statistical data 
on the adequacy of the levels of pension benefits and on the financial 
sustainability of the current scheme. 
Old-Age Income and Pension Politics in China 
The absolute number and the relative share of China’s older popula-
tion has been increasing since the 1990s. According to our own calcu-
lations based on data provided by the United Nations (n.d.), the value 
of China’s age dependency ratio – the number of dependent Chinese 
aged 60 years or older per 100 members of the working-age popula-
tion (individuals aged 15–59) – increased from 14 in 1990 to more 
than 19 by 2012, and is still rising. These developments have called 
existing institutions for providing old-age income into question. How 
old-age income support is organised in China and the underlying 
principles are therefore highly relevant subjects.  
Family support has been the main pillar of the old-age income 
guarantee in China for centuries. The institution of family security (ᇦ
ᓝ؍䳌 , jiating baozhang) is deeply rooted in Chinese culture. Lin 
names Confucianism as the core concept to understand the provision 
of welfare in East Asia (Lin 1999). He defines a “Confucian welfare 

1 The research for this paper was supported by the Fundamental Research Funds 
for the Central Universities, and the Research Funds of Renmin University of 
China (No. 12XNK025). 
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cluster” grouping as South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and mainland Chi-
na in this category of welfare systems in which families are the first 
resort for support in old age. The state plays only a minor role, if any.  
Striving for fast industrialisation in the late 1940s and early 
1950s, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at the time 
established a dualist system: First, state-guided efforts that assigned 
work units (অս, danwei) the task of providing old-age income target-
ed only urban industrial workers; in rural areas, family and kin, at 
times supported by the commune, remained the main provider of 
social welfare for dependent elderly. The second institution central 
for understanding public social policy in China is the household regis-
tration system (ᡧਓ, hukou), which defines the residence of a person 
and attaches to it a rural or an urban status that cannot easily be 
changed. These early policy choices constitute a legacy that continues 
to shape both the administration and the thinking about the clear 
institutional division of social policies for the rural and urban popula-
tion. Since the start of the transition period in 1979, these central 
institutions have come under pressure, and the government began 
searching for alternatives to provide for old-age income in the 
framework of its emerging market economy. The reform process, 
outcomes, and projections for the future development of the Chinese 
public pension system have turned into an object of interest for both 
Chinese and international scholars. One group within the Chinese 
labour force has received by far the most attention: full-time employ-
ees in urban enterprises. Reforms of the pension scheme for urban 
employees have been studied extensively since the early 1990s (Bé-
land and Yu 2004; Frazier 2010; Hussain 1994; Lin and Zhang 2005; 
World Bank 1997; Zheng 2002). These publications consider the 
reforms of the pension scheme for these “urban enterprise employ-
ees” against the backdrop of China’s transition from the planned to 
the market economy and assess the options for future directions. 
Despite urban enterprise employees constituting but a small part of 
the Chinese labour force, their scheme was often, though maybe not 
intentionally, presented as the defining representation of the Chinese 
pension system. Much less research has been conducted and pub-
lished in English on rural pensions. Among the first scholars who 
lifted the question of rural pensions up to the same level as the one 
for the urbanites was Gong (2003). He analysed the developments in 
rural and urban areas jointly instead of treating them as completely 
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unrelated policy fields. While rural pensions were a rather well-estab-
lished field of study for Chinese scholars in the late 1990s, English-
language publications focusing on the situation in only rural areas 
became more prominent throughout the first decade of the 2000s 
(Liu and Han 2010; Shi 2006; Zhang and Tang 2008). An increasing 
horizontal mobility in China and, especially, the question of social 
security for China’s rural-to-urban migrants triggered research agen-
das on equity and equality in the Chinese pension system and sparked 
the interest of researchers and practitioners alike (Wang 2011; Zheng 
and Wong 2006). Publications on the pension income for the grow-
ing group of urbanites without employers are nearly absent. The 
World Bank publication edited by Dorfman et al. (2013) is among the 
first major publications that list them next to the schemes for urban 
enterprise employees and rural farmers.  
Pension politics belongs to the wider field of social politics in 
China. It is one of the strategic policy fields for the CCP, as providing 
social welfare or income-replacement transfers are central to main-
taining social peace and stability. According to Ngok (2009), the CCP 
has the sole authority to redefine the development paradigms to 
shape public policymaking and define major policy goals. Chen 
(2003) refers to the CCP as an authoritarian sovereign that shapes 
social policymaking. However, research in the late 1990s and early 
2000s shows the clear limitations of the top leadership of the CCP to 
dominate social politics. The central–local relationship is now more 
salient to understanding social politics (Guan and Xu 2011). In their 
research on pension policy in China, Frazier (2010) and Lu (2008) 
stress the role of actors on different levels of government, especially 
the bureaucracy. Line ministries and local governments are linked to 
certain groups within the CCP leadership and have inherent interests 
as they compete over influence. What role civil society groups play, 
and whether their influence is substantially constrained, remains 
somewhat disputed (Mertha 2009). Additionally, the impact of public 
consultation on the policy process remains limited despite its increas-
ing institutionalisation (He and Thøgersen 2010). Last but not least, 
the presence of international organisations as partners in reforming 
China’s pension system shows that the policy process is no longer 
strictly closed to the outside world and that these organisations also 
comprise a part of the policy subsystem (Frazier 2010; Salditt, White-
ford, and Adema 2007; Stepan 2008).  
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With this paper, we are contributing to filling two gaps in schol-
arship: first, the dearth of in-depth studies on the policy processes in 
the field of Chinese pension politics and, second, the lack of attention 
that has been paid over the past decade or so to the old-age income 
situation for the largest population group in Chinese society – those 
in rural areas.  
Explaining the Establishment of the New
Pension Scheme and Coverage Extension
The establishment of the NRPS constitutes a policy change that 
brought with it a major coverage extension. How can the establishment of 
the NRPS be explained given the legacy of one-sided protection of urban employees 
and the dominance of family-based solutions for providing old-age income in the 
countryside? Research on the reform of social policies around the globe 
suggests that functional pressures alone cannot explain changes in 
public social policies (Hemerijck 2013). Instead, it is imperative to 
understand the interactions of different institutions and groups of 
actors, along with the role of ideas when explaining a certain policy 
process and outcome (Vanhuysse 2009). 
This study is an in-depth analysis of the policymaking process. 
Research on the policy process targets the so-called “black box” be-
tween policy input and policy output. Even though the ideal-typical 
policy-cycle heuristic with six phases has developed into a point of 
orientation, its application to an increasing number of countries has 
led to a growing number of variations, which feature different phases 
and sequence orders (Jann and Wegrich 2003). Applying the policy-
cycle heuristic to a country with a different political system, such as 
China, requires further adaptations. The work of Lieberthal and 
Oksenberg (1988) revealing the protracted nature of policymaking in 
China became a classic for students of the Chinese policymaking 
process. Heilmann developed a policy-cycle theory for China. Rear-
ranging the order of the phases of the ideal-typical policy cycle, “Chi-
na’s experimentation-based policy cycle” (Heilmann 2008) consists of 
eight phases (see Figure 1). Heilmann takes the generation of new 
policy options in phase I as a starting point for the policy cycle. He 
makes explicit that these options are a question neither of local, bot-
tom-up initiative nor of top-down initiation alone. Instead, it is the 
interplay between the levels of government, which are mutually de-
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pendent. After results of local initiatives are known and evaluated as 
positive, the top-level policy advocate searches for ways to broaden 
the group of supporters. Phase II sees an increasing number of actors 
involved, as domestic and foreign experts are invited to provide feed-
back on the policy initiative. If the policy community evaluates the 
new initiative as positive, and top-level decision makers show their 
support, the formulation of national guidelines for so-called “experi-
mental points” follows in phase III. In this phase, local officials com-
pete to provide specific input and to lobby that their location obtain 
official experimentation status. The national guidelines are a frame-
work rather than an instruction sheet for the implementation of but 
one specific solution. Local implementation in phase IV sees concur-
rent experiments, and local governments are required to report regu-
larly to higher-level authorities about the advances made. Phase V 
sees the internal and often public debate about the experiments. In 
the last step of consultation among policy makers and experts, it is 
the central government that chooses one “model experiment” to be 
extended nationwide. Government regulations are issued only in 
phase VI. Their drafting is a complex process of review and negotia-
tion open to only a limited number of state and party organs. The last 
word remains in all cases with the highest leaders in the State Council 
and Politburo. After the endorsement of the top leadership, the state 
administration passes a regulation or law. This document serves as a 
guiding light for nationwide implementation in phase VII. However, 
phase VII marks the end point in only few cases. Instead, it common-
ly triggers new rounds of experimentation that can start from phase I 
again after a general evaluation in phase VIII. While Heilmann’s heur-
istic is built upon his experience in the field of economic policy, re-
search by Liu Dongmei (2011) and others shows that the process in 
the field of social policy evinces many of the same characteristics.  
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Figure 1. China’s Experimentation-Based Policy Cycle 
Source: Heilmann 2008: 10, with minor modifications. 
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Our research method is process tracing (Collier 2011). Instead of a 
purely inductive approach, we take into consideration the rich litera-
ture on policymaking and empirical studies of the reform of the social 
security system in China. Falleti (2006) calls the deductive approach 
combined with process tracing “theory-guided process tracing” 
(TGPT). The researcher uses different types and sources of data such 
as documents, statistical data sets, and expert interviews.  
Central to our analysis is the triangulation of data from different 
sources and authors: government documents, expert reports, and 
interviews with government officials and leading experts. Statistical 
records from Chinese government agencies are complemented by 
data from international organisations. 
We reconstruct the policy process leading to the establishment 
of the NRPS and eventually to the extension of pension coverage in 
China making use of Heilmann’s policy cycle. The model, in combi-
nation with existing scholarship on policymaking in China and pen-
sion reform in general, serves as the basis to develop a hypothesis. 
Furthermore, it is used as a heuristic to trace the different phases in 
the policymaking process. We present the main actors of the reform – 
the proponents and opponents of the establishment of the NRPS, 
along with their instruments and strategies – and discuss how the 
overall context influenced the establishment of the new pension 
scheme. Pension reform is no longer a strictly domestic affair. Inter-
national actors – especially international financial institutions such as 
the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), but also 
specialised bodies such as the International Social Security Associa-
tion (ISSA) – are involved. They provide new ideas and policy solu-
tions, in addition to subsidies and support in capacity building. Oren-
stein (2008) has built a model on transnational actor intervention in 
pension-system reform. It suggests that transnational actors influence 
the search for solutions, join coalitions with national actors to ad-
vance specific solutions, and provide substantial input in the imple-
mentation phase. Reconstructing the policymaking process, we pay 
special attention to the role of international actors. 
Hypothesis
International actors played a decisive role in overcoming the legacies 
of one-sided protection in the Chinese pension system and in the 
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establishment of an official, state-supported pension scheme in the 
countryside. They have been present in all phases of the policy pro-
cess, contributing policy solutions, subsidies, and training.  
Process: Rural Pensions
As stated in the section on old-age income and pension politics in 
China, from the early 1950s to late 1990s public pension programmes 
were organised around the work unit, targeting employees in urban 
companies. The majority of Chinese living in rural areas had no ac-
cess to public pension programmes. Instead they relied on the sup-
port of kin in their old age. Initial initiatives to introduce rural pen-
sion programmes started in rich counties in the mid-1980s. Covering 
only a small number of individuals, the central government started 
initiatives to introduce a nationwide scheme at the beginning of the 
1990s. Led by the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MoCA), pilot program-
mes were rolled out throughout the 1990s, facing competition from 
the Ministry of Agriculture and the predecessor organisations of the 
National Development and Reform Commission (Shi 2008). Despite 
the interdepartmental competition, all pilot programmes had one 
thing in common: the goal of establishing a financially sustainable 
pension scheme that did not require state subsidies. The pension 
accounts were literally saving accounts, into which farmers and local 
enterprises made deposits. Even though the State Council supported 
the MoCA pilot, a State Council working group tasked with evaluat-
ing the performance of the insurance industry marked a change. In its 
final report, presented in 1998, the group recommended that the pilot 
programme be discontinued. Amidst the Asian financial crisis in 
1998, the State Council retreated from its previous commitment in 
favour of the pilot and transferred the responsibility for rural old-age 
income to the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MoLSS). For-
mally, local governments were again left without guidance on how to 
provide adequate old-age income to the rural population.  
A New Start
Until 2001, the MoLSS was primarily occupied with the extension of 
social insurance for urban employees that had been shaken to its core 
by the Asian financial crisis. It was only in 2002 that the MoLSS 
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commissioned a survey on the condition of rural pension schemes. It 
found that 1,955 counties throughout all 31 provinces operated some 
variant of the original pilot scheme (MoLSS 2003a: 289). The total 
number of people covered had dropped from a high of 82 million in 
1997 to approximately 54 million in 2002. Despite this, the ministry 
had little knowledge of the exact financial structures and benefit levels 
of the locally operated schemes. The turn of the year 2002/2003 
marked a change of leadership in the Politburo.  
Following on the decision of the CCP, the MoLSS issued two 
notices on strengthening work on the reform and correcting rural 
old-age insurance. Whereas the first was dated July 2003 (no. 115) 
and addressed to the respective local government offices for labour 
and social security, the notice in November (no.148) additionally 
listed the local MoCA offices of five provinces (Henan, Jiangxi, Hu-
bei, Shanxi, and Qinghai) and two autonomous regions (Ningxia and 
Xinjiang) (MoLSS 2003b, 2003c). With these two notices, the minis-
try offered a policy patronage to local governments willing to go for-
ward with the extension of rural pension schemes. According to 
Heilmann’s policy cycle, the process entered phase I. According to 
high-level civil servants at that time, the target group of the initiative 
was not yet the rural population at large, but specific groups, such as 
farmers whose land was expropriated and employees in township and 
village enterprises (TVE) (Song 2010: 100).  
Prior to the return of the central government on the scene, the 
most prominent models in academic and public debates were all lo-
cated in the richest and most advanced coastal provinces. Leading 
among those were the “Dongguan model,” implemented in one of 
the manufacturing hubs in Guangdong Province, and the “Sunan 
model,” in place in the southern part of Jiangsu Province.  
At the third plenary session of the 16th CCP Central Committee 
in October 2003, the “Decision on some major issues concerning 
improving the rural social security system” was taken. It included the 
principle that “old-age provision in rural areas should rely on family 
support, community service, and state assistance” (Birmingham, Cui, 
and Wu 2006: 15). After the top level endorsement, the reform had 
entered phase II by spring 2004. MoLSS chose two models for pro-
motion, one from Daxing, a southern district of Beijing (“Daxing 
model”), and one from the prefecture-level city of Qingdao in Shan-
dong (“Qingdao model”) as the references for experimental points of 
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the reform of rural old-age pension insurance (MoLSS 2004: 295). 
Both models combine an individual account with a social-pooling 
component. However, the funding sources and respective target 
groups are very different. The Daxing model works with individual 
contributions and government subsidies. It targets all rural residents 
aged 16–60 and participation is voluntary. In Qingdao, no govern-
ment subsidies are foreseen. Targeting local cadres and TVE workers, 
funding stems mainly from individual contributions, and contribu-
tions by the collectives and TVEs represent a secondary stream of 
income (Deng and Liu 2007; Lin 2011). The choice of two reference 
points with different funding sources reflects the debate over whether 
the government should take over financial responsibility.  
With a revision of the Constitution of the PRC in 2004, the posi-
tion of the MoLSS and other advocates who called for an increase of 
public spending for rural social security was strengthened. Article 45 
introduces the universal rights of Chinese citizens to state and soci-
etal support in old age: 
Citizens of the People’s Republic of China have the right to ma-
terial assistance from the State and society when they are old, ill, 
or disabled. The State develops social insurance, social relief, and 
medical and health services that are required for citizens to enjoy 
this right. 
This new constitutional norm signalled a change of direction for the 
development of the Chinese social security system away from a selec-
tive system rewarding the industrial workers and towards a system by 
which individuals could expect a guarantee of basic income security 
in old age.  
The exercise of reviewing the local experience helped the minis-
try to identify the lack of capacity as the main challenge for the future 
development of the system. In its approach to tackling these prob-
lems and advancing the rural pension project, it searched for partners 
both within and outside China. Phase III, the drafting of the experi-
mental points programme, was running in parallel with the consulta-
tion of domestic and international experts looking for answers to 
questions about policy design and management. International pension 
experts were commissioned to write a report with recommendations 
for pension reform in China, drawing from experiences in other 
countries. The results were presented to Premier Wen Jiabao on 12 
December 2004. From the public version of the paper, we learn that 
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old-age pensions for the rural areas was but a minor point in a docu-
ment that focused mainly on the pension system for urban employ-
ees. In respect to the design and set-up of pensions in rural areas, the 
experts recommended multiple pathways. Whereas TVE workers and 
some rural regions should be included in the urban pension system, 
they suggested non-contributory citizen pensions or a modification of 
the existing minimum-income scheme for the majority of the elderly 
(Asher et al. 2005: 30–31). In 2004 the central government started 
pilots to expand to the countryside the minimum-income scheme that 
had hitherto existed only in urban areas. The rural dibao (ߌᶁᴰվ⭏
⍫؍䳌ࡦᓖ, nongcun zuidi shenghuo baozhang zhidu) was operated sepa-
rately with much lower benefit-level standards than its urban coun-
terpart.  
In order to gain an in-depth understanding of the different pol-
icy options, Chinese line ministries actively looked for international 
partners. The MoLSS looked into ways to adapt the social insurance 
design for the rural areas. The MoCA – which is in charge of the 
minimum-income scheme in both urban and rural areas – favoured 
the non-contributory models. The international partners of the 
MoLSS in research projects were, amongst others, the United Na-
tions Development Program (UNDP) and the International Labour 
Organization (ILO). Programmes on capacity building with the 
World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB) were running in 
parallel. Furthermore, in September 2005 the MoLSS had signed an 
agreement with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). 
The project focused on both the design and implementation of the 
Chinese rural old-age pension (MoLSS 2006: 303–304, 2007a: 319). 
Japan shares many cultural traits with the Chinese, such as the social 
norm of respecting and taking care of the elderly, derived from Con-
fucianism. The main feature of the design of the Japanese pension 
system is coverage by a universal national basic pension that is com-
plemented by private or occupational pension products. There are 
three categories of insured people in the Japanese system: 1) self-
employed workers and persons engaging in the primary sector; 2) 
employed workers in public and private sector; and 3) their depend-
ents (spouses who earn no income, children, etc.). Individuals in cat-
egory 1 are required to pay a monthly premium to the national pen-
sion system and will later receive a defined amount financed from 
contributions from the current workforce and state subsidies. Insured 
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people in categories 2 and 3 will receive additional pensions from 
occupational pension funds (Pension Bureau of the Japanese Ministry 
of Health Labour and Welfare n.d.).  
The cooperation project under the headline “Research project 
innovation and management standardisation of China’s rural social 
pension insurance system” started officially in January 2006. In the 
meantime, the discussions evolving around the drafting of China’s 
11th Five-Year Plan (2006–2010) brought further support for the 
initiative to establish rural pensions. During the presentation of the 
draft to the 16th Central Committee of the CCP in October 2005, 
Premier Wen Jiabao called for improving the social insurance 
schemes and extending them to rural areas (Gov.cn 2005). In March 
2006, the chairman of the National Development and Reform Com-
mission, Ma Kai, named “Building a New Socialist Countryside” (⽮
Պѫѹᯠߌᶁᔪ䇮, shehui zhuyi xin nongcun jianshe) a primary goal of 
the incumbent leadership (Gov.cn 2006). With the start of the imple-
mentation of the campaign in 2006, its elements became increasingly 
visible. The campaign consists of five complementary elements: the 
elimination of restrictions on labour migration; a better protection of 
land rights; improvement in the income of people in rural areas 
through the provision of subsidies; the abolition of the agricultural 
tax; and increased central-government spending on health, education, 
and rural infrastructure (Ahlers 2014). Even though rural pensions 
were not explicitly named, the MoLSS used the campaign for the 
experimentation with different pension designs. By spring 2006, it 
had selected eight counties and city districts in seven provinces as 
experimental points for China’s new type rural social pension system 
(NRPS): Beijing: Daxing District; Shandong: Zhaoyuan City, Heze 
City, Mudan District; Anhui: Huoqiu County; Shanxi: Liulin County; 
Fujian: Nanping City, Yanping District; Sichuan: Tongjiang County, 
Yunnan: Nanhua County. The choice of the locations mirrors the 
different socio-economic development levels across China, from the 
rich coastal provinces to underdeveloped ones like Anhui. To im-
prove the management of individual accounts that had already been a 
central part of the failed pilot of the MoCA in the 1990s, the MoLSS 
started a cooperation with the Agricultural Bank of China. More than 
300 staff members of institutions of the rural pension system admin-
istration received training (MoLSS 2007a: 298). While the build-up of 
capacity found little opposition, the discussions about the very design 
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remained a tough issue, revealing conflict lines between different 
groupings in the domestic policy debate, and disagreement among 
international scholars and domestic ones. A leading international 
expert working for a joint project of the MoLSS, UNDP, and ILO 
presented the following framework as a policy design option: 
a compulsory contributory basic pension, with a target benefit of 
120 per cent of local minimum living standard level, and based on 
a pooling arrangement financed partly by individual contribution 
and partly by government. The contribution base would be the net 
income per capita of the rural population, with adjustments for 
poorer regions and an exemption for those living in absolute pov-
erty. It would be administratively and nancially simpler than an 
individual account system – and we estimate the fiscal impact if 
expanded nationwide may be around 1 per cent of GDP. Gov-
ernment contributions would of course be higher in poorer areas. 
(Bikales 2006: 71) 
Summarising the content, the framework suggests a clear departure 
from the design of the pilot in the 1990s. It does not make reference 
to employers, such as TVEs or the collectives. Instead, the individual 
and government subsidies alone are named as the sources for old-age 
income. Reference to family responsibility or the role of land owner-
ship are also absent. For domestic experts, especially the latter were 
central for elaborating potential solutions. With regard to how these 
solutions would look, views differed. He Ping, the director-general of 
the Social Security Institute, attached to the MoLSS, advocated for 
the extension of public old-age pension schemes on top of the exist-
ing system of family and communal support for the elderly in rural 
areas (He 2006: 163). Yang Tuan – the deputy director-general of the 
Policy Research Centre of CASS, suggested increasing the financial 
and administrative capacities of the villages to act as the basic unit for 
providing comprehensive mutual assistance. Financial schemes on 
individual bases would act as a complement (Yang 2006). According 
to the latter suggestion, existing programmes such as the “five guar-
antees” or “rural dibao” would be redeployed to guarantee old-age 
income and be complemented by individual saving plans where ne-
cessary.  
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A Preparation Exercise Turns Into Quasi-Nationwide 
Practice
Whereas originally the central government initiative to establish rural 
pension seemed to have little appeal to local governments, 21 more 
provinces were taking part in the preparation for the pilot for the 
NRPS by the end of 2007. The increase in the number of counties 
was even more impressive – from just eight to nearly two-thirds of 
China’s roughly 3,000 counties (MoHRSS 2008: 388). 
In August 2007, the MoLSS issued the Circular on the Issues Related 
to the Work on the Improvement of the Work on New Rural Social Insurance 
Pension and Social Security for Landless Farmers (MoLSS 2007b), in which 
a general audit of all local rural pension funds was announced. This 
step was decided upon by the State Council. Signed by the MoCA, 
the National Audit Office of the PRC; the document had additional 
weight, as it marked a clear point that the central government was 
determined to get a better understanding of the local situation of 
rural pensions and consolidate the management practice. Local gov-
ernments got the message that there was no way to escape the im-
plementation by referring to any of the other ministries. In line with 
the newest insights available, a deputy director-general of the MoLSS 
Pension Department presented the existing measures of the govern-
ment to provide rural elderly with sufficient old-age income in 2007 
as follows:  
The government protects the farmland contracting and operating 
rights of the elderly in rural areas and intensies the effectiveness 
of farmland- and the family-based elderly support model through 
laws. The government also encourages people to sign a “family-
based elderly supporting agreement,” which denes the elderly-
supporting responsibilities of the family members and support 
items and standards so as to ensure that the elderly enjoy the 
rights of being supported and assisted, and to strengthen the func-
tions of the family-based supporting systems in rural areas. (Tang 
2007: 224) 
Income from the NRPS was still considered as a complement to the 
existing sources of old-age income for farmers. The official decision 
to expand one single programme design across the country (phase V – 
from point to surface) had still not taken place. This reveals that 
some issues were still contested among the decision makers within 
the ministry as well as the highest ranks in the party and state leader-
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ship. Even though the MoCA was among the signatories to push 
forward the social insurance solution, it still worked on non-contribu-
tory solutions in cooperation with the United Nations Population 
Fund (UNPFA).  
During the 17th National Congress of the CCP in October 2007, 
the new Politburo was elected. Among the announcements made by 
the top political leadership was the intention to “explore approaches 
of establishing rural pension insurance and encourage local rural pen-
sion insurance pilot programmes” (Liu and Han 2010: 84).  
Top-Level Support for the NRPS 
With the government reorganisation in 2008 – for instance, the 
Ministry of Personnel being merged into the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Security in March of that year – the newly established Ministry 
of Human Resources and Social Security (MoHRSS) gained addition-
al administrative power. In October 2008, the CCP Central Commit-
tee published a decision that put the importance of the work on rural 
social pensions beyond any doubt. Among the issues listed in the 
Decision on Several Big Issues on Promoting the Reform and Development of 
Rural Areas, the commitment to establish an NRPS featured promin-
ently:  
We shall stick to the principles of covering as many people as pos-
sible, securing the basic livelihood, doing the work from multiple 
levels and making it sustainable so as to speed up the building of 
the social security system in rural areas; set up a new type old-age 
insurance system in rural areas according to the requirements of 
combining individual payment, collective allowances, and gov-
ernment subsidies; create conditions for working out effective 
measures for making the urban and rural old-age insurance sys-
tems consistent with each other; do a good job in providing social se-
curity for farmers whose land is requisitioned and provide social 
security for them before requisitioning their land so as to make 
sure that the basic living of farmers whose land is requisitioned is 
secured for a long term. (Central Committee of the CCP 2008; au-
thor’s emphasis) 
The State Council defined MoHRSS as the leading organisation of a 
new cross-departmental investigation group to prepare the “State 
Council Opinions on Launching New Rural Pension Insurance Pilot 
Programme” (Liu and Han 2010). The group conducted in-depth 
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investigations and paid field visits to counties across the country in 
which rural pension pilots were already running. Apart from the issue 
of administrative capacity, the financing mechanisms and the issue of 
coverage highlighted in the decision of the Central Committee were 
critical. In all Chinese localities the practice prevailed that participa-
tion was voluntary. This setting resulted in large variation of coverage 
rates among age groups. Surveys by independent domestic and inter-
national research groups confirmed the observation that participation 
is almost universal amongst those aged 45 to 59, and that it drops 
below 50 per cent for the younger age groups (Herd, Hu, and Koen 
2010). In the pilot areas of Baoji City, the participation of eligible 
persons aged 60 and above was even reported as 93.6 per cent in 
2008 (Zhang and Tang 2008: 1).  
During the 70th executive meeting of the State Council, on 24 
June 2009, Premier Wen Jiabao gave a speech in support of the 
NRPS and endorsed the design of a social insurance pension for rural 
areas. The characteristics of these are the guarantee of basic income 
security in old age, a broad coverage, flexibility in adjusting the struc-
tures, and sustainability in respect to its financial management. The 
design should consist of a basic pension financed out of general gov-
ernment revenue and an individual account in which contributions 
from the individually insured, the collective, and subsidies of local 
governments should come together (Zheng 2011: 79). Especially in 
the design we see an innovation in respect to the commitment of 
public spending for the purpose of rural old-age income. At the same 
time, the endorsement is a clear rejection of the idea of non-contribu-
tory pensions. An international expert involved in the process re-
called that “Wen Jiabao in particular was against the idea of social 
assistance [to fight old-age poverty]” (Anonymous 3 2014). This gives 
us an idea of the main conflict lines and the compromise found in 
phase VI. In order to supervise the implementation of the social in-
surance solution, the State Council installed the “Leading Group on 
the Pilot of the New Rural Social Insurance Pension” in 2009. Vice 
Premier Zhang Dejiang was appointed the leader of the group that 
brought together thirteen CCP and central government bodies: the 
State Council, Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, 
CCP Central Propaganda Department, CCP Organisational Depart-
ment, State Population and Family Planning Commission, Ministry of 
Public Security, China Disabled Persons’ Federation, General Office 
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of the State Commission for Public Sector Reform, General Office of 
the Leading Group on Rural Affairs, National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC), MoCA, Ministry of Land and Nation-
al Resources, and Ministry of Agriculture. MoHRSS Minster Yin 
Weimin, Vice Minister of Finance Wang Juncai, and Vice Secretary of 
the State Council Xiao Yaqing were appointed deputy leaders. The 
operational side was vested within a bureau in MoHRSS headed by 
Vice Minister Hu Xiaoyi. The vice minister was already known as an 
outspoken advocate of extending old-age insurance to the farmers 
and migrant workers. He considered it as an essential building block 
to the overall strategy of the government to improve the situation of 
Chinese society at large: 
The major defect of our social security systems is that old-age in-
surance does not cover farmers and rural migrant workers. If no 
proper institutional arrangement in old-age security is made for 
farmers and rural migrant workers at present, our social polarisa-
tion will get worse, and the goal of building our country into a 
moderately prosperous society in an all-round way cannot be real-
ised. (Hu 2008: 47) 
NRPS Turning Into an Official Pilot
Eventually, on 1 September 2009 the State Council published a guide-
line for the pilots for the new rural social insurance pension. The four 
main objectives of the new rural social insurance pensions are to 
provide “basic security, wide coverage, flexibility for adjustments, and 
financial sustainability” (State Council 2009). They correspond with 
the main points of the premier’s speech earlier in the same year. The 
benefit levels should start at a modest level and take into considera-
tion the economic development levels on the ground. Whereas the 
individual and family are named first in respect of their responsibility 
for the provision of old-age income, they are followed by the collec-
tive and then the government. Participation in the scheme is volun-
tary, and the central government is in charge of establishing a frame-
work with the basic principles and standards that have to be applied 
nationwide in phase VII. According to the document, local govern-
ments maintain the authority to make detailed decisions concerning 
the exact management and implementation of the scheme (Birming-
ham et al. 2009). In respect to the framework, the NRPS shows major 
similarities with the urban employee pension scheme. Individual ac-
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counts play an important role, being complemented by social pooling 
financed by government revenues. However, the authors of the State 
Council document made explicit that social insurance pensions as a 
combination of individual and social pooling accounts is only one 
component of a set of policies to guarantee for adequate old-age 
income. The others are family security, land security, and social wel-
fare policies such as dibao. The state-guaranteed monthly minimum 
pension payments are anything but generous. In 2009, the nominal 
level was set at CNY 55 (EUR 6.90) per month. It is financed out of 
general government revenues, and local governments are expected to 
complement it by local government resources to guarantee the basic 
security addressed in the guidelines. In order to help guarantee at 
least the minimum across the country, the central government com-
mitted to provide 50 per cent of the funding of the minimum as 
transfers to the interior provinces, and 100 per cent of the funding 
for the Western provinces (State Council 2009). To what extent the 
local government share is financed by the different levels of subna-
tional governments is based on local regulations.  
On top of the basic pension, individuals receive benefits from 
their individual account. The individual account is administered by 
the Agricultural Bank of China. Financial input comes from the in-
sured persons, and subsidies of the collective and local government. 
According to the guideline, the insured can choose between five dif-
ferent contribution rates annually: CNY 100, 200, 300, 400, or 500 
(EUR 12.50–62.50). Collectives are not mandated to make contribu-
tions, whereas local governments are required to make a contribution 
of at least CNY 30 (EUR 3.76) per year to the individual account. 
This practice is internationally known as “matching individual ac-
count contribution” and is thought to incentivise the insured to make 
contributions to the individual account or participate in a voluntary 
pension scheme in the first place.  
Looking into provincial-level and even county-level practice, we 
find a diversity of local regulations that stipulate different contribu-
tion rates and methods. Yet, the conversion factor – which deter-
mines the level of the monthly pension benefit from the individual 
account – and the fund investment and supervision rules are defined 
by the central government level, and local governments are supposed 
to comply. The conversion factor of 139 means that the beneficiary 
receives the total amount in the personal account divided by 139 as a 
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monthly benefit on top of the benefits from the social pooling ac-
count. It is 139, as there are 139 months between the national average 
life expectancy at birth, which is 71.5 years, and the retirement-entry 
age, which was set at 60 for the rural population in 2009 (State Coun-
cil 2009). However, Cai et al. (2012: 96) found that, in the years after 
the pilot was rolled out, there was great variety in the conversion 
factor, ranging from 120 in Suzhou to 180 in Zhuhai. Furthermore, 
the nationwide implementation did not end the debate or the search 
for feasible alternatives. In December 2009, two leading international 
pension experts – Nicolas Barr and Peter Diamond – presented an-
other commissioned paper on non-contributory pensions to the Chi-
nese leadership (Barr and Diamond 2010).  
There remains diversity in the practice even years after the cen-
tral government communicated its intention to follow a unified prac-
tice. As a leading government advisor on pension pointed out in an 
interview in 2012, the conversion factor remains one of the most 
hotly debated issues among provincial leaders and the central gov-
ernment. People in regions with lower life expectancies, especially in 
the Western provinces, feel disadvantaged compared to those in 
coastal provinces (Anonymous 1 2012). Considering the existing gap 
in life expectancy, the longevity risk borne by local governments dif-
fers, as do the potential central government subsidies flowing to the 
provinces. Despite ongoing debates about the management issues, 
participation in the scheme has increased year after year. Behind this 
development we also recognise Premier Wen Jiabao’s constant sup-
port in both internal documents and in speeches made available 
through the media. He has stressed time and again that  
the important thing for now is to ensure full coverage. After that 
is achieved, we can continue to improve these programmes and 
raise insurance standards in line with the country’s social and eco-
nomic development. (China Daily 2011)  
Impact: NRPS as a Success Story of the  
Present and for the Future?
Participation rates in the NRPS have exceeded the forecasts every 
year. In the first official year of the pilot, the number of participants 
had reached already more than 72 million. The Statistical Communi-
qué on National Economic and Social Development of 2011 reports 
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that there were more than 326.4 million people participating in the 
scheme that year. From 2012 onwards the communiqué reports the 
joint numbers: for the URPS and the NRPS. In 2014, the total num-
ber of participants stood at more than half a billion. Despite the ob-
vious success in respect to the increasing coverage rate and number 
of beneficiaries (see Figure 2), questions remain about the adequacy 
of the benefits and the (financial) sustainability of the system.  
Figure 2. Number of Insured in Countryside prior to NRPS (2002–2006), 
under the NRPS (2007–2012), Combined Figures NRPS and 
URPS (2013–2014)* 
Source: MoHRSS (multiple years). 
Note: *Since 2013, the Chinese government has provided just one figure for urban 
and rural participants in the NRPS and URPS. 
Adequacy 
The number of participants in the system, and especially the number of 
retirees, has increased so rapidly that close observers are already wary 
of the pace of development and warning of its unsustainability (Ano-
nymous 1 2012; Anonymous 2 2011). Figure 3 shows how the average 
annual benefits per retiree drop after the year 2008. The fast expansion 
of the NRPS from mainly affluent areas to poor areas and the number 
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of individuals receiving the minimum level of pensions jumping from 5 
million to 16 million within one year help explain the decisive decrease. 
In the year of the pilot’s nationwide launch, the annual average is less 
than CNY 500 (approx. EUR 40), but increases to CNY 700 in the year 
2010 and, finally, increases to nearly CNY 1,100 in 2014. The gross 
expenditure for the social insurance pensions increased from CNY 4 
billion in 2007 to CNY 157 billion in 2014 (Figure 3).  
Figure 3. Gross Expenditure and Average Annual Pension Benefit, 
NRPS, and RPS (2007–2014) 
Source: MoHRSS (multiple years). 
However, the absolute figures about the benefits for individuals and 
total expenditure of the new schemes say little without putting them 
into relation with a number of other key figures to assess how ade-
quate pension levels are. For about the past ten years or so, China has 
been operating a minimum livelihood guarantee programme in rural 
areas (rural dibao) – comparable to social-assistance schemes in West-
ern, developed countries. Rural dibao was implemented nationwide in 
2007. Due to the large differences in socio-economic development 
levels across China, subnational localities define the levels themselves. 
Comparing the benefits on the provincial level of the rural dibao and 
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Figure 4. Monthly Income from Social Programmes, Provincial-Level 
Averages (2012) 
Sources: Dibao: MoCA 2013; NRPSP: MoHRSS 2013. 
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the NRPS in 2011 (Figure 4) provides a differentiated answer to how 
adequate the pension benefit levels are. Indeed, the pension levels in 
the NRPS in the most urbanised provincial-level units such as Beijing, 
Chongqing, and Shanghai are equal to or even higher than rural dibao. 
In most of the remaining entities, NRPS levels are much more modest.  
Financial Sustainability 
We measure the financial sustainability of pension programmes in 
respect of the development of expenditure and revenue prospects for 
the medium to long term. Especially when looking into the ratio of 
active contributors to retirees on a nationwide basis, which is below 
3:1, the sustainability of the system is put into question. Even though 
the system is not pay-as-you-go, minimum pensions are largely fi-
nanced out of local-government revenues, which in turn depend on 
the conditions of the local economy. If we zoom in on the provincial 
level, we identify a diversity with respect to the ratio of active con-
tributors to retirees (Figure 5). When excluding the provincial-level 
municipalities, the ratios range from 5:1 in Tibet, down to less than 
1:1 in Jilin. Based on the situation on provincial levels that are cur-
rently in charge of devising province-wide frameworks for the NRPS, 
it becomes obvious that further reform both of the level of admin-
istration and of the pooling of rural pensions is necessary. With the 
rural-to-urban migration of especially younger cohorts, and more 
importantly interprovincial migration, a pension scheme based on the 
county level as a basic administrative unit is not a viable solution in 
the long run. Even for the urban employee pension scheme estab-
lished in 1995, national-level pooling is still not within reach due to 
the local opposition. A critical question in the next round of reform 
will be that of government responsibilities in financing rural pensions. 
In 2012 the minimum amount defined by the central government 
(CNY 55) was relatively low; in 2015 the government increased the 
level to CNY 75. This can be considered a measure to prevent over-
spending by local governments, but also a measure to curtail the cen-
tral government’s expenditure levels. In less developed and poorer 
regions, the central government is committed to paying a share of the 
subsidies. In richer areas, the local governments can decide themselves 
whether to increase the minimum benefit and subsidy levels beyond 
the centrally devised minimum. However, without clearly defined 
contribution levels from both the insured and the government, it is 
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questionable whether the central government can guarantee that the 
pension levels are sufficiently high in the different localities.  
Figure 5. Ratio of Active Contributors/Retirees NRPS, According to  
Province (2011) 
Source: NBS 2012: 951. 
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Conclusion 
With the introduction of the NRPS, the Chinese government has 
taken a clear step away from the one-sided guarantee by which old-
age income is provided for only salaried workers. For the first time in 
history, the Chinese rural population has access to a public old-age 
pension scheme, the government subsidising and guaranteeing a min-
imum old-age income. It marks a clear sign that the government aims 
to fight the marginalisation of the rural population. 
How can we explain the establishment of the NRPS? Top-level 
endorsement of one policy design by the premier and additional ear-
marked central government transfers are the main factors. Through 
the process tracing we gained a lot of empirical evidence, in respect 
of the policy debates, key actors, their strategies, and the instruments 
used to advance their goals. There are two main, partly overlapping 
issues: the role of the state in providing financial means for old-age 
income in rural areas, and the exact design of the respective policy. 
As for the first, the question of who pays has been crucial. For a long 
time, local governments in particular have been reluctant to support 
the initiative out of fear of not being able to cover the costs by them-
selves. They were supported by actors on the central-government 
level, who opposed the idea of public financing for the fight against 
old-age poverty, despite the problem of elderly people in the country-
side being left behind. With the revision of Constitution in 2004 and 
the campaign of “Building a New Socialist Countryside,” the leader-
ship around Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao underscored the central gov-
ernment’s commitment to establishing and co-financing public social 
transfer programmes in the countryside. Nonetheless, Wen Jiabao, 
who was in charge of supervising the initiatives, was reluctant to 
specify how the funding should be allocated. This leads to the second 
issue: the design. The MoLSS/MoHRSS and the MoCA advocated 
for different designs. The MoLSS/MoHRSS supported a social insur-
ance type solution – a modification of the model existing in urban 
areas for enterprise employees. The design advocated by the MoCA 
was a non-contributory pension scheme. Wen Jiabao’s endorsement 
of the social insurance solution in 2009 and the provision of ear-
marked financial transfers from the central government to provinces 
ended the search for a single policy design and resulted in coverage 
extension. The highest year-on-year increases in terms of NRPS cover-
age start only after the year 2009.  
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The influence of international actors was constant. The Chinese 
central government actively searched for international best practice 
and advice to inform its pension reform process. Both the MoLSS/ 
MoHRSS and the MoCA had international partnerships. These part-
nerships made a significant contribution to both the number of policy 
solutions to be discussed and capacity building. The capacity-building 
efforts were especially crucial to guaranteeing smooth implementa-
tion. However, the role of international experts was less decisive in 
explaining the establishment of the NRPS. The different design solu-
tions brought forward by these experts were already known to the 
Chinese in the early years of the new millennium. Furthermore, the 
final design deviates from the international advice and includes fea-
tures from the scheme for urban employees. Domestic experiments 
and their respective results triggered ongoing discussions and negotia-
tions between actors on different levels of government concerning 
the division of tasks and responsibilities, especially regarding the 
question of who would take on the financial burden. These informed 
the choice of eventually one design.  
Heilmann’s model was very apt for the process-tracing exercise. 
This study shows that experimentation, the interactions between 
different levels of government, and the compromises each level of 
government made remain the key characteristics in the Chinese pol-
icymaking process. Different from the original model, international 
actors are present in the different phases of the cycle. This finding 
opens avenues for future comparative research to ask whether the 
influence of international actors differs across policy fields. Adding to 
the general debate of policy diffusion and the role of international 
financial institutions, the process tracing revealed that bilateral co-
operation was an important channel for exchange in the field of pen-
sions.  
The impact and success of the implementation of the scheme is 
currently measured in the number of insured and pension levels for 
the individuals already benefitting from the public pensions. Over the 
long term, the success of the scheme needs to be measured against its 
capacity to provide pension benefits at adequate levels without over-
burdening the financial resources of the government. Even though 
the new scheme guarantees basic income security, a number of inbuilt 
defects remain. First, the scheme creates new boundaries for social 
mobility – between the informal and formal labour market. Second, it 
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constitutes an increasing financial burden for local governments. 
Third, questions about equality arise. In 2011, three times the amount 
of subsidies paid into the residence-based social insurance pension 
schemes were channelled in the pension funds for urban employees: 
CNY 77 billion vs. CNY 207 billion (Ministry of Finance 2012: 477). 
The gap narrowed in 2013 but remains large. According to the end of 
the year financial overview from the Ministry of Finance, the resi-
dence-based social insurance schemes received CNY 123 billion and 
the pension funds for urban employees received CNY 285 billion in 
subsidies in the fiscal year 2013 (Ministry of Finance 2014). Against 
this backdrop and given the merger of the NRPS and the URPS, the 
ongoing pension reforms in China require that further scholarly at-
tention be paid to how the pension system will develop in the mid- to 
long term. 
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